K – O


Keyuan, Zou, China’s U-Shaped Line in the South China Sea Revisited, Ocean Development & International Law, Volume 43, Issue 1, January 2012, pages 18-34
– Despite its existence on the Chinese maps for more than six decades, the U-shaped line, as a traditional maritime boundary line of China in the South China Sea, has never received a wide recognition in the world community, much less by the other claimant states in the South China Sea. The U-shaped line is a legal conundrum not only for China but also for the world community, particularly after the map with the U-shaped line, together with China’s Notes Verbale with respect to the claims to the outer continental shelves made by Malaysia and Vietnam, were submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf in May 2009. This article discusses China’s recent practice relating to the U-shaped line as well as the external factors that affect the validity of the line and tries to unravel the legal puzzle posed by the line.

Keyuan, Zou, Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice, Ocean Development & International Law, Volume 32, Issue 2, April 2001, pages 149-168
– Despite the great expansion of maritime zones of the coastal states, consequent to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, state practice indicates continued attempts at using concepts of historic waters and/or historic rights to assert jurisdiction. The Chinese claim to historic rights in its 1998 Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf is a new addition to the whole picture. It is the People’s Republic of China’s clear intention that the historic claim applies to the water areas in the South China Sea wherever China could not establish its 200-nm exclusive economic zone. This article assesses China’s historic claim in the context of international law, state practice, and judicial pronouncements.

Keyuan, Zou. Law of the Sea Issues Between the United States and East Asian States. Ocean Development & International Law; Vol.39, No.1, Jan 2008, pg.69-93.

– “Although having not yet acceded to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, the United States has contributed to the development of the international law of the sea in numerous ways, including responding to the so-called excessive maritime claims in East Asia and creating new rules of maritime enforcement.”

Keyuan, Zou. Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin. Ocean Development & International Law, Volume 30, Issue 3, September 1999, pages 235-254.
– Explores and assesses the legal issues relating to the boundary delimitation of the Gulf of Tonkin within the context of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 

Keyuan, Zou. The Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin. Ocean Development & International Law; 2005, 36:13–24.
– “This article addresses the recently ratified Sino-Vietnamese Boundary Delimitation Agreement in the Gulf of Tonkin and its implications for bilateral cooperation and development of friendly and neighboring relations between China and Vietnam.” 

Keyuan, Zou. Seeking Effectiveness for the Crackdown of Piracy at Sea. Journal of International Affairs; Vol.59, No.1, Fall 2005, pg.117.
Overview of the importance of shipping lanes in the South China Sea to international trade and the various threats of piracy.

Kim, Duk-ki. A Korean perspective. Marine Policy Volume 29, Issue 2 , March 2005, Pages 157-161.
From South Korea’s perspective, the EEZ is a sui generic zone in which military and intelligence activities are limited or not allowed without the consent of the coastal State. This is equally applicable in peace and war. Although several States stress that Article 58 of the 1982 UNCLOS permits such activities, increasing EW and IW capabilities may result in reinterpretation of certain provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS

Krasnow, Jay. Spratly Islands Dispute. Inventory of Conflict and Environment (ICE) Case Studies. May 1997.
– “Approximately 44 of the 51 small islands and reefs are claimed or occupied by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei. The conflict is the result of overlapping sovereignty claims to various Spratly Islands thought to possess substantial natural resources — chiefly oil, natural gas, and seafood.” One of a series of case studies from TED, The Trade and Environment Database at American University.

Kuan-Hsiung Wang. Bridge over troubled waters: Fisheries cooperation as a resolution to the South China Sea conflicts. The Pacific Review, Vol. 14 No. 4 2001: 531–551.
– “Determining the ownership or jurisdiction over the islands and waters in the South China Sea is not essential at this stage. In fact, claimant states can derive greater benefits in the South China Sea through cooperation in the management and conservation of fishery resources. Ultimately, the experience of fisheries cooperation can be extended to other fields.”


Leifer, Michael, Stalemate in the South China Sea, Asia Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1999
– “The islands and waters of the South China Sea constitute the last frontier in South-East Asia to the extent that the maritime zone was not effectively incorporated within the delimited and demarcated domains of the respective colonial powers….Their islands were not necessarily incorporated within post-colonial transfers of sovereignty; nor were they provided for by way of specific transfer of sovereignty in the political settlement of the Japanese Peace Treaty in 1951. This neglect, benign or otherwise, is of considerable significance because the South China Sea may be represented as the maritime heart of South-East Asia. Its domination by a single power could over time have far reaching strategic consequences affecting the geo-political and economic interests of both regional and extra-regional states.”

Leiter, Daniel and Stella Nordhagen. ASEAN Trade Patterns in the South China Sea Governing the South China Sea. Winter Term 2006, Middlebury College.
– “This website seeks to provide an overview of trade in the South China Sea Region, focusing particularly on the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).”

Live Piracy Report, IMB, Piracy Reporting Centre
– This map shows all the piracy and armed robbery incidents (attacks, attempts, and suspicious vessel activity) reported to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre during the current year. The reporting follows the definition of Piracy as laid down in Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and Armed Robbery as laid down in Resolution A.1025 (26) adopted on 2 December 2009 at the 26th Assembly Session of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).


Mak, JN. Incidents at Sea: Shipjacking, Maritime Muggings, Thefts and Illegal Migration in Southeast Asia, 2003.
– The author, a Research Fellow with the Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs (MIMA), analyzes trends of increasing piracy and possible causes in the the South China Sea region. This PowerPoint compares and contrasts data from the International Maritime Bureau and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Co-ordination Centre.

MALACCA: The Impact of Transportation on Wildlife in the Malacca Straits.
– American University,Trade and Environment Database Project, 2002,
“examines the globalization impact of transportation through the Straits of Malacca on undersea life, specifically dugong.”

Marine Protected Areas in South East Asia, ASEAN Regional Center for Biodiversity Conservation, 2002.
– Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) of nine ASEAN member countries were reviewed. Different issues pertaining to MPAs of each country are assessed and their management concerns evaluated. The pressures (i.e. threats) on the marine environment, the state of their habitats and the important management needs are examined. A priority action agenda and a regional strategic MPA framework are also proposed.
Maritime Claims Reference Manual, US Department of Defense.
– Provides a comprehensive general reference manual on the maritime claims of all coastal nations. Primary emphasis is on claims directly affecting navigation and overflight, with some information on other claims (e.g., Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), continental shelf claims, and environmental regulations. Lasted updated April 2010.

Maritime Shipping in Northeast Asia: Law of the Sea, Sea Lanes, and Security.University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Policy Paper 33, February 1998.
– Introduction by Michael Stankiewicz, Developments in Asian Maritime Trade by Stephen J. Meyrick, Northeast Asia: Transitional Navigational Issues and Possible Cooperative Responses by Mark J. Valencia, Marine Carriage of Petroleum with Special Reference to Northeast Asia by Chia Lin Sien, Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) Security and Access by Dr. Stanley B. Weeks, Security of SLOCs in East Asia by Seo-Hang Lee. This 82-page policy paper examines the strategic implications of increases in maritime shipping, energy imports and commodity exports in the sea lanes of East Asia. Detailed essays provide information on the evolution of trade dependence on this region, probabilities of economic crises and military threats, regional relations, and possibilities for cooperative solutions.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China. Basic Stance and Policy of the Chinese Government in Solving the South China Sea Issue. 2000.
– “The Chinese Government has always stood for negotiated settlement of international disputes through peaceful means. In this spirit, China has solved questions regarding territory and border with some neighboring countries through bilateral consultations in an equitable, reasonable and amicable manner. This position also applies to the Nansha Islands.”

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China. Historical Evidence to Support China’s Sovereignty over Nansha Islands. 2000.
– “China was the first to discover, name, develop, conduct economic activities on and exercise jurisdiction of the Nansha Islands.”

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China. International Recognition of China’s Sovereignty over the Nansha Islands. 2000.
– “Many countries, world public opinions and publications of other countries recognize the Nansha Islands as Chinese territory.”

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China. The Issue of South China Sea. June 2000.
– “China has indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and their adjacent waters.”

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China. Jurisprudential Evidence to Support China’s Sovereignty over the Nansha Islands. 2000.
– “China has indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and it has ample jurisprudential evidence to support this.”

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China. Nansha Islands – Origins. 2000.
– “China has indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and their adjacent waters.”

Mingjiang, Li. Pan-Tonkin Gulf Cooperation: De-securitising the South China Sea? RSIS Commentaries; Jan. 10, 2008.
– The South China Sea territorial dispute is the last but still salient security issue between China and several ASEAN countries. The emerging Pan-Tonkin Gulf Regional Economic Cooperation scheme has the potential to further de-securitise the South China Sea dispute and forge cooperation in many areas. The Pan-Tonkin Gulf proposal, if adopted, will turn the South China Sea into an “internal lake” of this regional economic zone.Article on the potential of the Pan-Tonkin Gulf cooperation proposal to de-securitise the South China Sea area and foster multilateral cooperation in maritime transportation, environmental protection, and joint resource exploitation.

Mo, John. “Options to Combat Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia”. Ocean Development And International Law, 2000.
– “It is argued that some form of government cooperation involving most of the governments of the Southeast Asian region is the best way to combat maritime piracy, although it is not an easy task due to various political, economical, and historical reasons.”


Naess, Tom. Epistemic Communities and Environmental Cooperation in the South China Sea, Workshop Paper. University of Oslo, 1999.
This paper analyses the regional scientific community in the South China Sea region, and assesses the effects of the informal workshop initiated by Indonesia – where regional experts are allowed to participate and exchange views – on the development of a new political regime/political behavior in the region.

Ng, Peter K. L. and K. S. Tan. The state of marine biodiversity in the South China Sea. The Raffles Bulletin of Zoology, Supplement No. 8 (The Biodiversity of the South China Sea): 2000, 3-7.
– Discusses the obstacles facing biologists in the South China Sea trying to gauge biodiversity and provides link to checklists designed to help prevent misidentification of species. Keywords: marine organisms, Technical Working Group on Scientific Research

Nossum,Johan Henrik. Baselines in the South China Sea. Workshop Paper, University of Oslo, 1999.
This paper is an introduction to the methodology of utilizing straight baselines, and it will present two areas where the development of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) leads to uncertainties when applying the straight baseline regime. The paper will also look into the possibility to reduce the disputed area in the region by an appropriate appliance of the straight baseline regime, and if such an appliance could support UNCLOS’ role as a tool for conflict resolution


Odgaard, Liselotte. The South China Sea: ASEAN’s Security Concerns About China. Security Dialogue, Vol 34, 11-24, 2003.
– This article investigates whether the South China Sea is a source of internal disagreement or unity in ASEAN. Part of a special issue of Security Dialogue, edited by Peter J. Burgess. “When the focus is on the possibilities of cooperation beyond what is necessary for regional peace and stability, five different member-state groupings can be identified according to their outlook on the desirable level of US and Chinese regional engagement, their support for a dialogue focusing on Sino-Southeast Asian cooperation and their views on the scope of a code of conduct. By contrast, when addressing the prospects of coexistence, unity prevails within ASEAN. The member states are in agreement that Southeast Asia cannot opt out of the structure of deterrence that is consolidated between the USA and China. In addition, they agree that a practice of consultation and a conservative code of conduct between Southeast Asia and China will contribute to peace and stability by offering assurance that pending disputes in the South China Sea will be settled by the indigenous powers through peaceful means and will remain separate from the outer structure of strategic competition.”

Orbach, Michael K. Beyond the Freedom of the Seas. National Academy of Sciences, Ocean Policy for the Third Millennium (Fourth Annual Roger Revelle Commemorative Lecture).13 November 2002.
-Most terrestrial space and resources were in the past “open access, common pool,” owned by no one and used by all . As densities of use increased, governance institutions developed to create order in that use, and to channel its costs and benefits. Such incursions to the “open access, common pool” notion are now occurring in the ocean, and in the atmosphere, creating significant changes.

O’Rourke, Ronald. CRS Report for Congress: China Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress. Open CRS, Congressional Research Service; April 22, 2011 – RL33153.
– Report addressing the question of how China’s military modernization should be factored into decisions about US navy programs. “Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries.”